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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 94-172
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JOHN BRUCE HUBBARD, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the sixth circuit
[May 15, 1995]

  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court,
except as to Parts IV and V.
  In unsworn papers filed in a bankruptcy proceeding,
petitioner made three false statements of fact.  Each of
those misrepresentations provided the basis for a
criminal conviction and prison sentence under the
federal false statement statute, 18 U. S. C. 1001.  The
question we address is whether 1001 applies to false
statements made in judicial proceedings.

                            I
  In 1985, petitioner filed a voluntary petition for bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.  In the
course of the proceedings, the trustee filed an amended
complaint and a motion to compel petitioner to surren-
der certain business records.  Petitioner opposed the
relief sought by the trustee in a pair of unsworn,
written responses filed with the Bankruptcy Court.
Both of his responses contained falsehoods.  Petitioner's
answer to the trustee's complaint falsely denied the
trustee's allegations that a well-drilling machine and
parts for the machine were stored at petitioner's home

and in a nearby warehouse.  Petitioner's response to the
trustee's discovery motion incorrectly stated that peti-
tioner had already turned over all of the requested
records.
  When the misrepresentations came to light, petitioner
was charged with three counts of making false state-
ments under 18 U. S. C. 1001.  That statute provides:
      -Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of
any department or agency of the United States
knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers
up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact,
or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ments or representations, or makes or uses any false
writing or document knowing the same to contain
any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.-
Relying on our decision in United States v. Bramblett,
348 U. S. 503 (1955), the District Court instructed the
jury that a bankruptcy court is a -department of the
United States- within the meaning of 1001.  The jury
convicted petitioner on all three 1001 counts, and the
District Court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 24
months' imprisonment.
  On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, petitioner argued that his convictions under
1001 were barred by the so-called -judicial function-
exception.  First suggested over 30 years ago in Morgan
v. United States, 309 F. 2d 234 (CADC 1962), cert.
denied, 373 U. S. 917 (1963), this doctrine limits the
extent to which 1001 reaches conduct occurring in the
federal courts.  Under the exception, only those misrep-
resentations falling within a court's -administrative- or
-housekeeping- functions can give rise to liability under
1001; false statements made while a court is perform-
ing its adjudicative functions are not covered.
  The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's convictions
under 1001.  Although the judicial function exception
has become entrenched over the years in a number of
Circuits, the Sixth Circuit concluded, over a dissent, that
the exception does not exist.  16 F. 3d 694 (1994).  That
conclusion created a split in the Circuits, prompting us
to grant certiorari.  513 U. S. __ (1994).  We now
reverse.

                           II
  Section 1001 criminalizes false statements and similar
misconduct occurring -in any matter within the jurisdic-
tion of any department or agency of the United States.-
In ordinary parlance, federal courts are not described as
-departments- or -agencies- of the Government.  As
noted by the Sixth Circuit, it would be strange indeed
to refer to a court as an -agency.-  See 16 F. 3d 694,
698, n. 4 (1994) (-[T]he U. S. Court of Appeals [is not]
the Appellate Adjudication Agency-).  And while we have
occasionally spoken of the three branches of our Govern-
ment, including the Judiciary, as -department[s],- e.g.,
Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475, 500 (1867), that
locution is not an ordinary one.  Far more common is
the use of -department- to refer to a component of the
Executive Branch.
  As an initial matter, therefore, one might be tempted
to conclude that 1001 does not apply to falsehoods
made during federal court proceedings.  This common-
sense reading is bolstered by the statutory definitions of
-department- and -agency- set forth at 18 U. S. C. 6.
First adopted in 1948, and applicable to all of Title 18,
the definitions create a presumption in favor of the
ordinary meaning of the terms at issue:
      -The term `department' means one of the executive
departments enumerated in section 1 [now 101] of
Title 5, unless the context shows that such term
was intended to describe the executive, legislative,
or judicial branches of the government.
      -The term `agency' includes any department, inde-
pendent establishment, commission, administration,
authority, board or bureau of the United States or
any corporation in which the United States has a
proprietary interest, unless the context shows that
such term was intended to be used in a more
limited sense.-
Under 6, it seems incontrovertible that -agency- does
not refer to a court.  -Department,- on the other hand,
might be interpreted under 6 to describe the Judicial
Branch, but only if the -context- of 1001 -shows- that
Congress intended the word to be used in the unusual
sense employed in Mississippi v. Johnson.  We believe
that 18 U. S. C. 6 permits such an interpretation only
if the context in 1001 is fairly powerful.  -Shows- is a
strong word; among its definitions is -[t]o make apparent
or clear by evidence, testimony or reasoning; to prove;
demonstrate.-  Webster's New International Dictionary
2324 (2d ed. 1942).  Cf. Rowland v. California Men's
Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U. S. __, __
(1993) (slip op., at 5-6) (discussing similar provision
requiring adherence to presumptive definition unless
context -indicate[d]- a different meaning).
  In Rowland, we explained the proper method of
analyzing a statutory term's -context- to determine when
a presumptive definition must yield.  Such an analysis,
we explained, requires a court to examine -the text of
the Act of Congress surrounding the word at issue, or
the texts of other related congressional Acts . . . .-  Id.,
at __ (slip op., at 4-5); see also id., at __ (slip op., at
1-2) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 689-690, n. 53
(1978).  Review of other materials is not warranted.  -If
Congress had meant to point further afield, as to
legislative history, for example, it would have been
natural to use a more spacious phrase, like `evidence of
congressional intent,' in place of `context.'-  Rowland,
506 U. S., at __ (slip op., at 5).
  In the case of 1001, there is nothing in the text of
the statute, or in any related legislation, that even
suggests-let alone -shows--that the normal definition
of -department- was not intended.  Accordingly, a
straightforward interpretation of the text of 1001, with
special emphasis on the words -department or agency,-
would seem to lead inexorably to the conclusion that
there is no need for any judicial function exception
because the reach of the statute simply does not extend
to courts.  Our task, however, is complicated by the fact
that the Court interpreted -department- broadly 40 years
ago in Bramblett.  We must, therefore, turn our atten-
tion to that case before deciding the fate of the judicial
function exception.

                           III
  Defendant Bramblett was a former Member of Con-
gress who had falsely represented to the Disbursing
Office of the House of Representatives that a particular
person was entitled to compensation as his official clerk.
He argued that he could not be convicted under 1001
because his falsehood was directed to an office within
the Legislative Branch.  348 U. S., at 504.  The Court
rejected this argument, concluding that the word
-department,- as used in 1001, -was meant to describe
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the
Government.- Id., at 509.  Although Bramblett involved
Congress, not the courts, the text and reasoning in the
Court's opinion amalgamated all three branches of the
Government.  Thus, Bramblett is highly relevant here
even though its narrow holding only extended 1001 to
false statements made within the Legislative Branch.
  We think Bramblett must be acknowledged as a
seriously flawed decision.  Significantly, the Bramblett
Court made no attempt to reconcile its interpretation
with the usual meaning of -department.-  It relied
instead on a review of the evolution of 1001 and its
statutory cousin, the false claims statute presently
codified at 18 U. S. C. 287, as providing a -context- for
the conclusion that -Congress could not have intended to
leave frauds such as [Bramblett's] without penalty.-  348
U. S., at 509.  We are convinced that the Court erred by
giving insufficient weight to the plain language of 6
and 1001.  Although the historical evolution of a
statute-based on decisions by the entire Cong-
ress-should not be discounted for the reasons that may
undermine confidence in the significance of excerpts from
congressional debates and committee reports, a histori-
cal analysis normally provides less guidance to a
statute's meaning than its final text.  In the ordinary
case, absent any -indication that doing so would frus-
trate Congress's clear intention or yield patent absurdi-
ty, our obligation is to apply the statute as Congress
wrote it.-  BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U. S. __,
__ (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting).
  As noted above, a straightforward reading of the
statute suggests a meaning of -department- that is fully
consistent with the definition set forth in 6.  See supra,
at 3-6.  Similarly unremarkable is the language of the
original Act of Congress adopting what is now 1001.
That piece of legislation-the Act of June 18, 1934, 48
Stat. 996 (1934 Act)-amended what was then 35 of the
Criminal Code to provide, in pertinent part:
-[W]hoever shall knowingly and willfully falsify or
conceal or cover up by any trick, scheme, or device
a material fact, or make or cause to be made any
false or fraudulent statements or representations, or
make or use or cause to be made or used any false
bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate,
affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to contain
any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry, in
any matter within the jurisdiction of any department
or agency of the United States or of any corporation
in which the United States of America is a stock-
holder . . . [shall be punished].-  (Emphasis added).
This language conveys no different message regarding
-department- than the current version of 1001.
  What, then, of the earlier statutory history chronicled
in Bramblett?  We believe it is at best inconclusive, and
that it does not supply a -context- sufficiently clear to
warrant departure from the presumptive definition in 18
U. S. C. 6.
  The earliest statutory progenitor of 1001 was the
original false claims statute, adopted as the Act of
March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863 Act).  That
enactment made it a criminal offense for any person,
whether a civilian or a member of the military services,
to
-present or cause to be presented for payment or
approval to or by any person or officer in the civil
or military service of the United States, any claim
upon or against the Government of the United
States, or any department or officer thereof, knowing
such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent.-
The 1863 Act also proscribed false statements, but the
scope of that provision was far narrower than that of
modern-day 1001; the Act prohibited only those false
statements made -for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding
in obtaining, the approval or payment of [a false] claim.-
12 Stat. 696.  The Court explained in Bramblett that the
false claims provision in the 1863 Act -clearly cover[ed]
the presentation of false claims against any component
of the Government to any officer of the Government,-
348 U. S., at 505, and it asserted similar breadth for
the false statement portion of the Act, ibid.
  The false statements provision in the 1863 Act re-
mained essentially unchanged for 55 years.  In 1918,
Congress amended the statute to provide as follows:
-[W]hoever, for the purpose of obtaining or aiding to
obtain the payment or approval of [a false] claim, or
for the purpose and with the intent of cheating and
swindling or defrauding the Government of the
United States, or any department thereof, or any
corporation in which the United States of America is
a stockholder, shall knowingly and willfully falsify
or conceal or cover up by any trick, scheme, or device
a material fact, or make or cause to be made any
false or fraudulent statements or representations, or
make or use or cause to be made or used any false
bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate,
affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to contain
any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry [shall
be punished].-  Act of October 23, 1918, ch. 194, 40
Stat. 1015-1016 (1918 Act) (additions in italics).
The scope of this new provision is unclear.  Although it
could be read to create criminal liability for government-
wide false statements, its principal purpose seems to
have been to prohibit false statements made to defraud
Government corporations, which flourished during World
War I.  Cf. Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger
Corporation, 513 U. S. __, __ (1995) (slip op., at 13-14)
(tracing history of Government corporations).  In one
important respect, moreover, the statute remained
relatively narrow: it was limited to false statements
intended to bilk the Government out of money or
property.  See United States v. Cohn, 270 U. S. 339
(1926).  Given the continuing focus on financial frauds
against the Government, the 1918 Act did not alter the
fundamental character of the original false claims
statute.
  The 1934 Act, which created the statute we now know
as 1001, did work such a change.  Congress excised
from the statute the references to financial frauds,
thereby severing the historical link with the false claims
portion of the statute, and inserted the requirement that
the false statement be made -in any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States.-  This addition, critical for present purposes, is
subject to two competing inferences.  On one hand, it
can be read to impose new words of limitation-whose
ordinary meaning connotes the Executive Branch-in an
altogether reformulated statute.  On the other hand, it
can be viewed as stripping away the financial fraud
requirement while not disturbing the pre-existing
breadth the statute had enjoyed from its association
with the false claims statute.
  The Bramblett Court embraced the latter inference,
finding no indication in any legislative history that the
amendment was intended to narrow the scope of the
statute.  We think this interpretation, though not
completely implausible, is nevertheless unsound.  The
differences between the 1934 Act and its predecessors
are too dramatic to evidence a congressional intent to
carry forward any features of the old provision.  More-
over, our comments, over the years, regarding the 1934
legislation-including those contained in Bramblett
itself-contradict the notion that such a -carry-forward-
occurred.
  We have repeatedly recognized that the 1934 Act was
passed at the behest of -the Secretary of the Interior to
aid the enforcement of laws relating to the functions of
the Department of the Interior and, in particular, to the
enforcement of regulations . . . with respect to the
transportation of `hot oil.'-  United States v. Gilliland,
312 U. S. 86, 93-94 (1941); see also United States v.
Yermian, 468 U. S. 63, 72 (1984) (the 1934 Act was
-needed to increase the protection of federal agencies
from the variety of deceptive practices plaguing the New
Deal administration-); id., at 80 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (the statute was prompted by problems arising from
-the advent of the New Deal programs in the 1930's-).
Indeed, the Bramblett Court itself acknowledged the
connection between the 1934 Act and the proliferation of
fraud in the newly formed Executive agencies:
      -The 1934 revision was largely the product of the
urging of the Secretary of the Interior.  The Senate
Report, S. Rep. No. 1202, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,
indicates that its purpose was to broaden the statute
so as to reach not only false papers presented in
connection with a claim against the Government, but
also nonmonetary frauds such as those involved in
the `hot-oil' shipments.-  348 U. S., at 507.
None of our opinions refers to any indication that
Congress even considered whether the 1934 Act might
apply outside the Executive Branch, much less that it
affirmatively understood the new enactment to create
broad liability for falsehoods in the federal courts.  In
light of this vacuum, it would be curious indeed if Con-
gress truly intended the 1934 Act to work a dramatic
alteration in the law governing misconduct in the court
system or the Legislature.  The unlikelihood of such a
scenario only strengthens our conclusion that the
Bramblett Court erred in its interpretation of 1001's
statutory history.
  Putting Bramblett's historical misapprehensions to one
side, however, we believe the Bramblett Court committed
a far more basic error in its underlying approach to
statutory construction.  Courts should not rely on
inconclusive statutory history as a basis for refusing to
give effect to the plain language of an Act of Congress,
particularly when the Legislature has specifically defined
the controverted term.  In Bramblett, the Court's method
of analysis resulted in a decision that is at war with the
text of not one, but two different Acts of Congress.
  Whether the doctrine of stare decisis nevertheless
requires that we accept Bramblett's erroneous interpreta-
tion of 1001 is a question best answered after review-
ing the body of law directly at issue: the decisions
adopting the judicial function exception.

                           IV
  Although other federal courts have refrained from
directly criticizing Bramblett's approach to statutory
construction, it is fair to say that they have greeted the
decision with something less than a warm embrace.  The
judicial function exception, an obvious attempt to impose
limits on Bramblett's expansive reading of 1001, is a
prime example.  As the following discussion indicates,
the judicial function exception is almost as deeply rooted
as Bramblett itself.
  The seeds of the exception were planted by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit only
seven years after Bramblett was decided.  In Morgan v.
United States, 309 F. 2d 234 (CADC 1962), cert. denied,
373 U. S. 917 (1963), the defendant, who had falsely
held himself out to be a bona fide member of the bar,
was prosecuted on three counts of violating 1001 for
concealing from the court his name, identity, and non-
admission to the bar.  After first acknowledging that,
but for Bramblett, it might well have accepted the
argument that Congress did not intend 1001 to apply
to the courts, the Court of Appeals upheld the convic-
tion.  But the Court was clearly troubled by the poten-
tial sweep of 1001.  Noting that the statute prohibits
-concealment- and -covering up- of material facts, as
well as intentional falsehoods, the Court wondered
whether the statute might be interpreted to criminalize
conduct that falls well within the bounds of responsible
advocacy.  The Court concluded its opinion with this
significant comment:
-We are certain that neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court intended the statute to include
traditional trial tactics within the statutory terms
`conceals or covers up.'  We hold only, on the
authority of the Supreme Court construction, that
the statute does apply to the type of action with
which appellant was charged, action which essen-
tially involved the `administrative' or `housekeeping'
functions, not the `judicial' machinery of the court.-
Ibid.
  Relying on Morgan, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed a conviction several years later -because
1001 does not apply to the introduction of false docu-
ments as evidence in a criminal proceeding.-  United
States v. Erhardt, 381 F. 2d 173, 175 (1967) (per
curiam).  The Court explained that the judicial function
exception suggested in Morgan was necessary to prevent
the perjury statute, with its two-witness rule (since
repealed), from being undermined.  Ibid.
  Once planted, the judicial function exception began to
flower in a number of other Circuits.  The Ninth Circuit
summarized the state of the law in 1985:
-[T]he adjudicative functions exception to section
1001 has been suggested or recognized by appellate
decisions since 1962, not long after the Supreme
Court decided that section 1001 applies to matters
within the jurisdiction of the judicial branch.  In
these twenty-three years, there has been no re-
sponse on the part of Congress either repudiating
the limitation or refining it.  It therefore seems too
late in the day to hold that no exception exists.-
United States v. Mayer, 775 F. 2d 1387, 1390 (per
curiam) (footnote omitted).
The Second Circuit sounded a similar theme in 1991,
relying in part on the congressional acquiescence to
which the Ninth Circuit had adverted in Mayer.  The
Second Circuit wrote:
      -No court, to our knowledge, whether due to its
acceptance of the exception or to prosecutorial
reticence, has ever sustained a section 1001 convic-
tion for false statements made by a defendant to a
court acting in its judicial capacity.  The exception
was first articulated nearly thirty years ago and
`. . . [i]t therefore seems too late in the day to hold
that no exception exists.'  Mayer, 775 F. 2d at
1390.-  United States v. Masterpol, 940 F. 2d 760,
766.
  Although not all of the courts of appeals have endorsed
the judicial function exception, it is nevertheless clear
that the doctrine has a substantial following.  See n. 2,
supra.  Moreover, as both the Ninth and the Second
Circuits observed, Congress has not seen fit to repudiate,
limit, or refine the exception despite its somewhat
murky borders and its obvious tension with the text of
the statute as construed in Bramblett.  On the other
hand, it is also true that Congress has not seen fit to
overturn the holding in Bramblett, despite the fact that
the opinions endorsing the judicial function exception
evidence a good deal of respectful skepticism about the
correctness of that decision.

                            V
  With the foregoing considerations in mind, we now
turn to the difficult stare decisis question that this case
presents.  It is, of course, wise judicial policy to adhere
to rules announced in earlier cases.  As Justice Cardozo
reminded us, -[t]he labor of judges would be increased
almost to the breaking point if every past decision could
be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's
own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the
courses laid by others who had gone before him.-  B.
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921).
Adherence to precedent also serves an indispensable
institutional role within the Federal Judiciary.  Stare
decisis is -a basic self-governing principle within the
Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive
and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a juris-
prudential system that is not based upon `an arbitrary
discretion.'-  Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U. S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting The Federalist No. 78,
p. 490 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton)).  See also
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U. S. __, __ (1992) (slip op., at 11-12) (joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).  Respect for
precedent is strongest -in the area of statutory construc-
tion, where Congress is free to change this Court's
interpretation of its legislation.-  Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U. S. 720, 736 (1977).
  In this case, these considerations point in two conflict-
ing directions.  On one hand, they counsel adherence to
the construction of 1001 adopted in Bramblett; on the
other, they argue in favor of retaining the body of law
that has cut back on the breadth of Bramblett in
Circuits from coast to coast. It would be difficult to
achieve both goals simultaneously.  For if the word
-department- encompasses the Judiciary, as Bramblett
stated, 348 U. S., at 509, the judicial function exception
cannot be squared with the text of the statute.  A court
is a court-and is part of the Judicial Branch-whether
it is functioning in a housekeeping or judicial capacity.
Conversely, Bramblett could not stand if we preserved
the thrust of the judicial function exception-i. e., if we
interpreted 18 U. S. C. 1001 so that it did not reach
conduct occurring in federal court proceedings.  Again,
although Bramblett involved a false representation to an
office within the Legislative Branch, the decision lumped
all three branches together in one and the same breath.
See ibid. (-department- in 1001 -was meant to describe
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the
Government-).
  We think the text of 1001 forecloses any argument
that we should simply ratify the body of cases adopting
the judicial function exception.  We are, however,
persuaded that the clarity of that text justifies a
reconsideration of Bramblett.  Although such a recon-
sideration is appropriate only in the rarest circum-
stances, we believe this case permits it because of a
highly unusual -intervening development of the law,- see
Patterson, 491 U. S., at 173, and because of the absence
of significant reliance interests in adhering to Bramblett.
  The -intervening development- is, of course, the
judicial function exception.  In a virtually unbroken line
of cases, respected federal judges have interpreted 1001
so narrowly that it has had only a limited application
within the Judicial Branch.  See nn. 2 and 10, supra.
This interpretation has roots both deep and broad in the
lower courts.  Although the judicial function exception
has not been adopted by this Court, our review of
Bramblett supports the conclusion that the cases endors-
ing the exception almost certainly reflect the intent of
Congress.  It is thus fair to characterize the judicial
function exception as a -competing legal doctrin[e],-
Patterson, 491 U. S., at 173, that can lay a legitimate
claim to respect as a settled body of law.  Overruling
Bramblett would preserve the essence of this doctrine
and would, to that extent, promote stability in the
law.
  Stare decisis has special force when legislators or
citizens -have acted in reliance on a previous decision,
for in this instance overruling the decision would
dislodge settled rights and expectations or require an
extensive legislative response.-  Hilton v. South Carolina
Public Railways Comm'n, 502 U. S. 197, 202 (1991); see
also Casey, 505 U. S., at __-__ (slip op., at 11-14) (joint
opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
Here, however, the reliance interests at stake in adher-
ing to Bramblett are notably modest.  In view of the
extensive array of statutes that already exist to penalize
false statements within the Judicial Branch, see, e.g., 18
U. S. C. 1621 (perjury); 1623 (false declarations before
grand jury or court); 1503 (obstruction of justice); 287
(false claims against the United States), we doubt that
prosecutors have relied on 1001 as an important means
of deterring and punishing litigation-related miscon-
duct.  But we need not speculate, for we have direct
evidence on this point.  The United States Attorneys'
Manual states quite plainly that -[p]rosecutions should
not be brought under 18 U. S. C. 1001 for false
statements submitted in federal court proceedings-; it
instead directs prosecutors to proceed under the perjury
or obstruction of justice statutes.  United States Attor-
neys' Manual - 9-69.267 (1992).  Clearer evidence of
nonreliance can scarcely be imagined.
  Similarly unimpressive is the notion of congressional
reliance on Bramblett.  The longstanding judicial
function exception has, to a large extent, negated the
actual application of 1001 within the Judiciary.  It is
unlikely that Congress has relied on what has, for many
years, been an unfulfilled promise.
  In sum, although the stare decisis issue in this case is
difficult, we conclude that there are sound reasons to
correct Bramblett's erroneous construction of 1001.
Although we could respect prior decisions by endorsing
the judicial function exception or by adhering to Bram-
blett while repudiating that exception, we believe
coherence and stability in the law will best be served in
this case by taking a different course.  Limiting the
coverage of 1001 to the area plainly marked by its text
will, as a practical matter, preserve the interpretation of
1001 that has prevailed for over 30 years and will best
serve the administration of justice in the future.

                           VI
  Bramblett is hereby overruled.  We hold that a federal
court is neither a -department- nor an -agency- within
the meaning of 1001.  The Court of Appeals' decision is
therefore reversed to the extent that it upheld petition-
er's convictions under 1001.
                                      It is so ordered.